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I INTRODUCTION 
In its latest quarterly rep01t, the Office of Treaty Settlements, the government agency 
charged with negotiating settlements of historic Treaty claims, lists 11 settlements as 
having been reached since 21 September 1992 (see table below). There are cmTently 
approximately 900 claims registered before the Waitangi Tribunal. While each 
settlement sees numerous claims extinguished, it seems likely that the settlement 
process will continue for many years. In evidence before the Maori Affairs select 
committee in early August, the director of the Office of Treaty Settlements refused to 
be drawn on whether the settlement process would be completed this millennium. 1 
Settlements since 21 September 1992 2 
Claimant group 
Fishe1ies 
gati Whakaue 
gati Rangiteaorere 
aua1 
ainui Raupatu 
Waimakuku 
Rotoma 
Te Maunga 
gai Tahu 
gati Turangitukua 
ouakani 
e Uri o Hau3 
Year Settled 
1992/93 
1993/94 
1993/94 
1993/94 
1994/95 
1995/96 
1996/97 
1996/97 
1996/97 
1998/99 
1999/2000 
1999/2000 
This paper focuses on one area of the Treaty settlement process - parliamentaiy 
scrntiny. Pait II outlines the Treaty settlement process. Prut III discusses the cmTent 
role of Parliament in this process and limitations on its role. Pait ]V examines the 
normative ru·guments for and against greater parliamentru·y scrutiny. Prut V examines 
the new procedures for scrutinising international treaties, while Prut VI examines 
whether these procedures could be adapted for deed of settlement legislation. 
1 Jonathan Milne, "Don 't hold your breath, Clark tells Treaty agencies" ( 13 August 2001) The 
Dominion Wellington 18. 
2 O nice o [ Treaty Settlements Quarterly report to 31 March 200 I (Wellington, 200 1) 2. 
3 The Deed of Settlement between Te Uri o Hau and the Crown is still awaiting legislative 
implementation. 
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II THE TREATY SETTLEMENT PROCESS 
The Office of Treaty Settlements is responsible for co-ordinating government policy 
with respect to Treaty of Waitangi claims relating to Crown acts or omissions prior to 
21 September 1992. 4 While most of the settlement legislation dealt with by 
Parliament relates to the settlement of these 'historical grievances', this is not 
exclusively the case. The Wai tutu Block Settlement Act 1997 and the Tutae-Ka-
Wetoweto Forest Bill , which is cunently before the House, are examples of 
legislation implementing settlements that fall outside the nmmal historical settlements 
process. In both cases a deed of settlement and a conservation covenant was entered 
into between the Maori registered proprietors of land and the Crown. The legislation 
gives effect to the agreements . Rather than being for the purpose of settling Treaty 
grievances, the purpose of the agreements was to ensure the land in question was 
managed in a manner consistent with conservation values. The Department of 
Conservation deemed the land to be of particular conservation value. The Crown 
purchased the cutting rights in perpetuity and reached agreement with the landowners 
as to the management of the land. 
These settlements fall within the ambit of this paper because the same principles 
apply to the way Parliament can scrutinise them as apply to legislation implementing 
histmical settlements. Also, in each case, in addition to cutting rights , pai1 of the 
quantum paid by the Crown in these cases was in consideration for the withdrawal of 
Treaty claims over the land. The Waitutu Block Settlement Act also prohibits the 
Waitangi Tribunal from any further investigation into the claims previously lodged. 5 
A The process for historic claims 
Once a claim is lodged with the Waitangi Tribunal a claimant group can ask the 
Office of Treaty Settlements or the Minister in Charge of Treaty ofWaitangi 
Negotiations to commence negotiations .6 As a first step the Crown requires the 
4 Office of Treaty Settlements Healing the past, building the future: A Guide to Treaty of Waitangi 
Claims and Direct Negotiations with the Crown (WeJlington, 1999) 22. 
5 Waitutu Block Settlement Act 1997, s 13. 
6 Office of Treaty Settlements Treaty of Waitangi Claims Direct Negotiations Process: An Introduction 
(Wellington, 1999) 3. 
claimants to establish three elements. First they need to prove the claim. In many 
cases, the preference of claimants is to have a Waitangi Tribunal rep01t as this 
provides a clear basis for negotiations. The Crown prefers direct negotiation 
wherever possible, without recourse to the Waitangi Tribunal process .7 The Office of 
Treaty Settlements sees the Waitangi Tribunal process as quite separate from 
negotiations with the Crown and will not f01mally negotiate on a claim that is under 
active consideration before the Waitangi Tribunal. 8 However, the Office of Treaty 
Settlements will 'carefully consider' the Waitangi Tribunal's findings as pa1t of the 
'proving the claim' stage of their process. 
Once claimants have proved the claim, they need to consolidate claims so that they 
are comprehensive and at the iwi level. The Crown does not settle claims issue by 
issue and 'strongly prefers' to settle at the iwi level. 9 Once these steps have been 
taken the Office of Treaty Settlements requires proof that the negotiators purpo1ting to 
represent the claimant group have a clear mandate from the claimant group. The 
mandating process is finalised once Cabinet, on the advice of the Office of Treaty 
Settlements and Te Puni Kokiri (the Ministry of Maori Development), recognises a 
deed of mandate. 
Once the deed of mandate has been achieved the Crown seeks to achieve frnmal 
ground rnles for negotiations refeITed to as Terms of Negotiations. 10 These allow the 
Crown and the claimants to move to f01mal negotiations . The goal of the f01mal 
negotiations is to reach a Deed of Settlement. Before a deed is signed the patties may 
enter into a Heads of Agreement. This outlines the basis for the final deed of 
settlement. The Office of Treaty Settlements is cunently seeking to move directly to 
the Deed of Settlement stage in many negotiations . 11 Once a Deed of Settlement is 
reached it needs to be ratified by both sides. On the Crown side, it is finalised by 
7 Office ofTreat:y Settlements, evidence to the Maori Affairs Conu11.illee. 9 August 2001. no transcript 
available. 
8 Office of Treaty Settlements Treaty of Waitangi Claims Direct Negotiations Process: An lntroduc:tion 
(Wellington, 1999), 5. 
9 Office of Treaty Settlements, above. 5. 
10 Office of Treaty Settlements, above, 13. 
11 Office of Treaty Settlements, "Responses to Supplementary Questions from the Justice and Electoral 
Committee" (July 2001) 1. 
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Cabinet approval. 12 Following Cabinet approval the Deed, as agreed by the Crown 
and the negotiators for the claimant group, needs to be ratified by the wider claimant 
group. Once the claimant group has ratified a Deed of Settlement the Crown and 
claimant representatives sign it. From this point it is legally binding on both parties. 
B The nature of the settlements 
While the economic redress in settlements draws much attention , settlements have 
three pai1s: a fmmal apology, cultural redress and economic redress . The formal 
apology both details the history of the pai1icular Treaty breaches and sets out an 
apology from the Government on behalf of all ew Zealanders . 
Cultural redress can take a number of frnms in different settlements . In the Ngati 
Ruanui settlement, cultural redress takes the form of an acknow I edgement of the 
traditional , historical, cultural and spi1itual association that Ngati Ruanui has with 
places and sites owned by the Crown within their area of interest. This is manifested 
by: 
• statutory acknowledgements under the Resource Management Act 1991 and the 
Histmic Places Act 1993 
• Deeds of Recognition guaranteeing Crown consultation with regard to ce11ain sites 
• the recognition of a special area or Taki Poipoiia o gati Ruanui within an 
existing conservation area 
• the establishment of protocols on matters of cultural impm1ance between Ngati 
Ruanui and government depai1rnents 
• changing official place names 
• transfening ai·eas of special significance 
• acknowledging the association of Ngati Ruanui with indigenous species , aquatic 
life and the argillite known as Puurangi, within the Ngati Ruanui area of interest 
• restoration of access to traditional foods and food gathering ai·eas .
13 
12 Office of Treaty Settlements Treaty of Waitangi Claims Direct Negotiations Process: An 
Introduction (Wellington, 1999), 16. 
13 Deed of Settlement between the Crown and Ngati Ruanui (Wellington, 2001 ) 
s 
Economic redress will nmmally be made up of a combination of Crown-owned land 
and cash. Settlements can also include other economic elements such as a 1ight of 
first refusal to buy surplus Crown land within the settlement area. 
III CURRENT ROLE OF PARLIAMENT IN THIS PROCESS 
Parliament has no fmmal role in the negotiating process . The only role for Parliament 
is to process the legislation implementing the settlements as agreed between the 
Crown and the patties to the settlement. Once Cabinet has confomed the Deed of 
Settlement on behalf of the Crown ai1d the claimant group has ratified it the Minister 
in Charge of Treaty ofWaitangi Negotiations and representatives of the claimants 
sign the Deed and enter into a binding legal agreement. All that is left is for 
Pai·liament to pass the legislation implementing the agreement. 
There has been some debate about whether even this limited role is necessary, lai·gely 
due to concerns about delays in passing implementing legislation.14 The table below 
shows the time taken to progress a number of recent settlements . Few settlements 
already achieved faced significant delays in the legislative process . With the 
exception of the Wai tutu Block Settlement, in each case the legislation was processed 
in a much shmter time frame than applies to other legislation. 
Bill Introduced Assent Elapsed time 
Pouakani 7 September 12 December 3 months 
2000 2000 
Ngati 17 June 1999 14 October 4 months 
Turangitukua 1999 
Ngai Tahu 31 March 1998 1 October 1998 6 months 
Claims 
Settlement 
Waitutu Block 20 August 1996 14 November 1 year 3 months 
Settlement 1997 
Waikato 1 August 1995 3 November 3 months 
Raupatu Claims 1995 
Settlement 
14 For example, Ministry of Justice Post Electio11 Briefing fo r Incoming Minister~~ (Wellington, 1999) 
para 4.4.4. 
6 
The elapsed time is a little misleading. The Ngai Tahu settlement was considered in 
select committee for 150 hours and then took just under 26 hours , under urgency , to 
complete its Committee of whole House stage. For comparison the Mat1imonial 
Prope1ty Amendment Bill , one of the most controversial pieces oflegislation enacted 
this Parliament, spent almost 22 hours in Committee of the whole House and 37 hours 
at select committee. The Ngati Turangitukua Settlement Bill was sent to the Maori 
Affairs Committee on 13 July 1999 with an instmction that it be repo1ted back by 29 
July 1999. The committee was granted an extension of time to 31 August 1999. It 
was still unable to repmt in time so the bill was discharged from the committee 
without a repmt. On 7 September 1999 the House resolved, against the votes of the 
Government, a highly unusual course of events, to re-refer the bill to the Maori 
Affairs Committee. The committee finally repmted on 4 October 1999. 
CmTently there are approximately twice as many bills on the Order Paper as there 
were at this stage in the last Parliament. With parliamentary time at a premium the 
potential for significant delays in passing implementation legislation is greatly 
increased. For legislation to be passed it needs to be able to reach the top of the Order 
Paper. Getting legislation to the top of a ~ull Order Paper is a questi on of relative 
primities. If a settlement bill is moved to the top of the Order Paper to ensure its 
timely passage, another item on the Government's legislative programme will be 
delayed. The Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Bill required over 30 hours of time in the 
House to move through all its stages . Even if the Government could secure sufficient 
supp01t to take the House into mgency, this would be a major disrupti on to any 
government's legislative programme. It is one thing for a government to be 
committed to expediting settlement legislation in the abstract, it is quite another for it 
to piimitise this over its other parliamentar·y objectives . 
The impact of the pressure for parliamentary time can be seen from the progress 
of the Tutae-Ka-Wetoweto Forest Bill. This bill was introduced on 6 October 
2000 and reported from the Maori Affairs Committee on 11 Apri I 2001 . It is 
cunently awaiting third reading, having completed the Committee of the whole 
House stage on 30 August 2001 . Du1ing the debate on the second reading, 
former Speaker and one time Minister of Maori Affairs, Hon Doug Kidd 
highlighted the delays facing the legislation: 
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The previous National Government and those who supported it at various stages have, in 
these matters, a proud record that has yet to be anything like matched by U1e present 
Government. It has been in office for 20 monU1s, but is only now moving to ilie second 
reading of a very small, simple bill concerning a settlement that was signed on 9 October 
1999. So we are here to hurry this bill along, now U1at U1e Govcnm1ent has [rnally 
decided to move on it. 
I would add, in parenthesis, that a number of what we might call Maori bills are 
rusticating on the Order Paper- bills that the select committee finished wiU1 months ago . 
Every now and again we remind ourselves of tbem, and ask ourselves where they are. 
Are they lost? Some of them arc also bills introduced during U1e time of U1c previous 
National Government, and they relate to matters iliat have been agreed upon. The present 
select committee has reported unanimously to this House on them, and U1e Government 
has chosen to treat that excellent, cooperative work wiU1 ignore [sic] , if not with 
contcmpt. 15 
Perhaps the best indication of whether the House will be able to pass implementing 
legislation in a timely fashion will come when the Te Uri o Hau Claims Settlement 
Bill is introduced later this year. This will be the first historical settlement to be fully 
processed by the cmTent Parliament. 
The Ministry of Justice suggests that to "avoid the need for separate pieces of 
legislation for each settlement and the associated time delays" it is necessary to 
consider replacing individual legislation with generic settlement legislation or an 
annual omnibus settlement bill. 16 In the last Parliament the then Justice and Law 
Refmm Committee considered the need for individual legislation for all settlements. 
The committee noted that the passing of legislation is desirable for claimants as it 
fmmalises the claim and the apology. However, given the amount of parliamentary 
time taken by settlement legislation (the gai Tahu legislation being fresh in the 
committee's mind) the committee questioned whether a general empowe1ment statute 
would be preferable. 17 
15 (2 August 2001) 593 NZPD 10658. 
16 Ministry of Justice, above. para 4.4.4. 
17 Justice and Electoral Committee Report on the I 999/7000 Estimates.for Vo te Justice and Vo te Treaty 
Negotiations ( 1999) 6 
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It is hard to see how the need for specific legislation could be avoided. The Office of 
Treaty Settlements argues specific legislation is required for two reasons. 18 It makes 
the settlements final and removes the ju1isdiction of the comts and the Waitangi 
Tribunal to investigate the claims once they have been settled. Removing the right to 
access the cou1ts is a significant step and requires specific legislation. The Office of 
Treaty Settlements also notes the impo1tant symbolic role of specific legislation. One 
of the most imp01tant elements of non-monetary redress in a settlement is the f01mal 
apology from the Crown recorded in an Act of Parliament. 
A Parliament's normal role in scrutinising legislation 
Abolishing individual legislative implementation of settlements would also remove 
the only opp01tunity Parliament has to scrutinise proposed settlements - scrutiny of 
the bills to implement the settlements . Parliament's role in scrutinising the legislative 
proposals of the Executive is central to our system of government. The ability of the 
political executive to dominate the legislature has been a major theme in the 
voluminous literature on the role of Parliament, and more pa1ticularly its purp01ted 
decline, in Westminster-de1ived systems. 19 Most authors20 commenting on the 
decline of Parliament are arguing for the strengthening of the legislature with respect 
to the executive. Indeed this was one of the arguments used to supp01t electoral 
system refo1m in New Zealand.2 1 
The main opp01tunity for substantive scrutiny of the legislative proposals in the ew 
Zealand system of government occurs at the select committee stage of the legislative 
process . Select committees n01mally adve1tise for public submissions and call for 
18 Office of Treaty Settlements, "Answers to Written Questions from U1e Justice and Electoral Sel ect 
Committee" (July 2001) 3. 
19 For example: Andrew Hill and Aniliony Whichelow What's wrong with Parliament? (Penguin, 
Ham1ondsworth, 1964); Dean Jaensch Getting Our Houses in Order (Penguin Australia, Ringwood, 
Victoria, 1986); TF Lindsay Parliament fro m the Press Galle1J (Macmillan, London, 1967); Lord 
Hailsham Th e Dilemma of Democracy (Collins, London, 1978); Tom McRae A Parliament in Crisis .· 
the Decline of Democracy in New Zealand (Sheildaig, Wellington, 1994); Geoffrey Palmer New 
Zealand's Constitution in Crisis (Mcindoe, Dunedin, 1992); Peter Wilcnsk.i ' Can parliament cope?' in 
JR Neth.creole Parliament and Bureaucracy (Hale & lremonger, Sydney, 1982). 
20 Some take the contrary view, see for example Peter Duncan "The relevance of parliament: U1e 
executive view." ( 1996) 10(2) Legislative Studies 32; June Verrier "The future of parliamentary 
research services: to lead or to follow?" ( 1996) 11( I) legislative Studies 36, 37. 
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rep01ts from the Government depmtments most closely concerned with the 
legislation . As well as receiving written submissions from the public, committees 
hear witnesses who wish to present their submissions in person. This public 
involvement is a key element in the process. When government legislation is 
introduced we can usually assume that considerable work has gone into its 
development. There will n01mally have been consultation with other depaitments and 
interest groups. However, most of this work goes on behind closed doors. The very 
open nature of the public submission and hearing process enhances the legitimacy of 
the process. The expectation is created that some credence will be paid to public 
submissions. Where there is significant public concern expressed dwing the hearings 
of evidence this makes it difficult politically for a government to press on with the 
legislation it sent to the committee without any modifications , though a government 
with a clear legislative majority may well do so. 
New Zealand's system of select committees has been viewed favourably by 
commentators outside New Zealand22 and Bu1rnws and Joseph go as far as to desc1ibe 
New Zealand's committee system as "a crucial bastion of democracy in our legislative 
process." 23 Ce1tainly there is a pattern of significant changes being made to 
legislation in the select committee process 24 It also appears that Members of 
Parliament value select committee work highly in comparison at least to speaking in 
the House. 25 
2 1 For example: Royal Commission on the Electoral System Towards a Better Democracy (Wellington , 
1986) para 2.182; Mai Chen "Remedying New Zealand's Constil1ltion in Crisis: ls MMP part of the 
answer?" (1993) NZLJ 22, 39. 
22 Ken Coghill "Scrutiny of Victorian bills." 10(2) Legislative Studies, 23; Bruce Stone "Size and 
Executive-Legislative Relations in Australian Parliaments." ( 1998) 33 Australian Journal of Political 
Science 35 , 52. 
23 John Burrows and Phillip Joseph "Parliamentary Law Making." ( 1990) New Zealand Law Journal , 
306. 
24 Marcus Ganley "Do New Zealand 's select committees make a difference'!" in Parliament 2000: 
Towards a Modern Committee Systelll (Papers oft11e 22nd Annual National Conference of the 
Australasian Study of Parliament Group. Parliament House Brisbane, 15 July 2000; forthcoming 200 l ); 
Walter Iles "Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation." (199 1) Statute Law Review, 165, 172-173; 
Geoffrey Palmer Unbridled power? (Wellington, Oxford University Press, I 979) 23, Geoffrey Skene 
New Zealand Parliamentary Committees: an Analysis (Institute of Policy Studies. Wellington, 1990) 
19-21. 
25 Marcus Ganley "Public Perceptions of the ew Zealand Parliament" (2000) 14(2) Legislative 
Studies, 73 . 
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B Limited scrutiny of treaty legislation - the 'scope rule' 
However, with legislation to implement settlements of Treaty grievances, as with 
legislation to implement international agreements, the role of Parliament is 
constrained. If the implementing legislation is substantively amended, the other paity 
to the agreement may decide that the agreement has not been honoured. This leaves 
Pai·liament in what is , effectively, a take it or leave it position. If it believes the 
legislation needs substantive amendment, it may well have to reject the legislation in 
its entirety. 
The clearest manifestation of the limitations is the way the concept of 'scope' 
operates to limit amendments to Treaty implementation legislation . The concept is 
intended to prevent a bill from being amended dming the legislative process so that it 
deals with matters other than those that were adve1tised when it was introduced. 
Although the word 'scope' commonly used in pai·liamentaiy practice26 it does not 
appeai· in the Standing Orders of the legislatures of New Zealand, Australia, Canada 
or the United Kingdom. 27 In New Zealand the rule is outlined in Standing Order 
283(2) for select committees and Standing Order 295(2) for the Committee of the 
whole House. Both provisions read: 
The committee may recommend amendments that are relevant to the subject-matter of 
the bill, are consistent with the principles and objects of the bill, and 0U1erwise conform 
to Standing Orders and practices of the House. 
The principle is elaborated in Speaker's Ruling 91 /6, which states "A bill can be 
amended only in ways that are relevant to the text. It cannot be turned into something 
that it is not, and did not stait out as. " 
Bills that implement international treaties or deeds of settlement of claims under the 
Treaty of Waitangi have a paiticularly naITow scope. The purpose of such bills is to 
26 L M Barlin (ed) House of Representatives Practice (3 rd Canberra, 1997) 378,380; Harry Evans (ed) 
Odgers ' Australian Senate Practice (9 ed Canberra 1999) 262; Donald Limon and WR McKay (eds) 
Erskine May 's Treatise on the Law, Privileges. Pmceedings and Usage of Parliament (22 ed, 
Butterworths, London, 1997) 520, 525-526. 
27 Tim Cooper "In Search of Scope" (2000) 15( l ) Legislative Studies 33 
l 1 
implement an international treaty or a deed of settlement so amendments must be 
consistent with the treaty or deed concerned. 
C Further limits on bills to confirm agreements 
In addition to the scope rnle there are also paiticular rules of parliamentary procedure 
relating to bills to confom agreements. 28 This means that neither a select committee 
or the Committee of the Whole House can substantively amend such bills in a manner 
that is not acceptable to the pmties to the deed or treaty being implemented. Rt Hon 
Sir Douglas Graham expressed the principle in the following te1ms : 
... in the case of a Bill to give effect to an agreement between the Crown and another 
party, Parliament should not insert conditions in the implementing legislation that are not 
acceptable to the two parties, except in exceptional circumstancei9 
Likewise it would be out of order to amend material quoted directly from a treaty or 
deed, as they have independent existences . 
The effect is that the House and its committees m·e much more tightly constrained in 
their consideration of these bills than with other legislati on. However, the bills can 
still be examined to dete1mine whether the provisions in the bill appropriately 
implement the treaty or deed concerned. Treaties or deeds do not necessarily set out 
in fine detail how they are to be implemented; there may be vm·ying approaches to 
implementation that are still consistent with the instrument concerned. The House 
and its committees may also exmnine provisions to determine whether they 
necessarily arise from the deed or treaty. Also the drafting of legislation can be 
scrutinised for both its accuracy and its appropriateness. 
The select committee that spent over 150 hours examining the gai Tahu settlement 
desc1ibed the way the constraint should be understood in the following te1ms : 
28 Limon and McKay, above, 527-528. 
29 Rt Hon. Doug Graham (26 August 1998) 571 NZPD 11644 (Responding as Minister in Charge of 
Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations to an oral question from Hon Ken Shirley) 
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We accept that it is Parliament's task to determine whether to give effect to the settlement 
that has been agreed between two parties, but not to substitute a different settlement. It is 
also Parliament's task to evaluate whether the provisions in the bill do give proper effect 
to the negotiated settlement. In this way, it is within our power to recommend 
amendments that will ensure that the bill's provisions work in a teclmical sense and tliat 
all necessary provisions are included, or changed to correct errors of fact or law3° 
It would appear that the Courts might not see Parliament's role as quite as constrained 
as Parliament itself does. In Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu v Waitangi Trihuna/ 31 
McGechan J made the following comments regarding proposed amendments to the 
Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Bill : 
Parliament appears to have started with one view, and ended wit11 t11e reverse, or perhaps 
in a state of frozen uncertainty. I am not minded to regard t11e rejection of amendments 
expressly reserving the rights of Te Tau llrn iwi as a reliable signal one way or the other. 
Those amendments could have been refused either because that was not the position 
which Parliament wished to preserve, or because Parliament regarded t11at as t11e position 
prevailing in any event. There may well have been a politically based unwillingness to 
adopt amendments of any sort whatsoever . 
D Recent limits to scrutiny - referring bills with limiting iustructions 
The most recent bill to implement a deed of settlement, the Tutae-Ka-Wetoweto 
Forest Bill, saw a fmther constraint on the select committee consideration of the 
legislation. The resolution referring the bill to the Maori Affairs Committee included 
an instruction "that the committee be constrained in its consideration of the bill by the 
deed and covenant entered into by the Crown and the people of Rakiura." The effect 
of this constraint is not clear, but it appears to be the product of frustrations expressed 
by the previous Minister in Charge of Treaty ofWaitangi Negotiations du1ing the 
consideration of the Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Bill (see below). Jf it is not 
redundant then it must place some greater constraint on the committee than that 
contained in the scope rnle. The committee's commentary indicates that the 
30 Ngai Tal1u Claims Settlement Bill , no 111-2 (Conrn1enta.I)' by the Maori Affairs Conunittee) iii . 
3 1 Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu v Waita11gi Tribunal (4 April 2001) High Court Wellington CP7/0l , 25 
McGechan J 
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committee took the constraint in the instmction seriously. In a section entitled "Limit 
on scope of amendments" the committee notes : 
The resolution referring the bill to the committee included an instruction "that the 
committee be constrained in its consideration of the bill by the deed and covenant 
entered into by the Crown and the people ofRakiura." We have kept this constraint in 
mind in considering the amendments we are recommending to the House. The 
amendments shown are not inconsistent wiU1 eiU1er the deed or U1e covenant. However, 
the committee is aware the Crown and U1e people ofRakiura may come to an agreement 
to vary the terms of the deed. If U1i s occurs before the bill passes through the House, the 
committee hopes the House will seriously consider amending the bill to give effect to 
any changes to the deed at a later stage? 
Again when discussing significant issues relating to Tangata Whenua status and 
customary 1ights the committee avoids making any amendments on the basis 
that bill is merely confoming the deed and the covenant. 33 
E A limited role, but a role nonetheless 
The cmTent procedures for parliamentary scrutiny of Treaty legislation represent a 
compromise between the desire of the legislature to 1igorously scrutinise legislation 
and the concern not to unde1mine settlements. Legislation is sent to select 
committees. While the Justice and Law Refo1m Committee considered the Waikato-
Tainui settlement, the practice now is to send settlement legislation to the Maori 
Affairs Committee. The committee hears evidence and recommends limited 
amendments . Where the committee has substantive concerns, these can be 
highlighted to the House in the committee's commentary on the bill. 
The Maori Affairs Committee 's consideration of the Tutae-Ka-Wetoweto Forest Bill 
is indicative of the role select committee scrutiny can play. Despite the rest1ictions, 
the committee unanimously recommended a number of changes to the bill. The 
preamble was amended to clarify that the bill did not deem the Forest to be a national 
park. The clause purp01ting to apply the offence provisions of the Reserves Act 1977 
32 Tutae-Ka-Wetoweto Forest Bill, no 68-2 (Commentary by the Maori Affairs Committee) 3. 
33 Tutae-Ka-Wetoweto Forest Bill, no 68-2 (Commentat)' by the Maori Affairs Conunittee) -1- . 
to the Forest was amended and a mis-desc1iption of the land to be covered was 
con-ected. 
These changes were impmtant. However, there are much broader issues in the bill on 
which the committee was unable to make recommendations. Of paiticular impmtance 
was the question, raised by Te Runanga O Ngai Tahu, of whether it is approp1iate for 
Parliament to legislatively detennine who is tangata whenua in an ai·ea and what 
customa1y 1ights apply. The committee repmted its concerns to the House, but could 
do no more. 
IV SHOULD PARLIAMENT HA VE A ROLE TO PLAY? 
Parliamentary practice with regard to Treaty settlement legislation has been to take a 
cautious approach towards scrutinising the legislation to avoid undennining the 
settlement reached. This pait of the paper examines the no1mative question, what 
should Pai·liament's role be in the Treaty settlement process? 
A Debates about the appropriate role of Parliament 
The problem with allowing Pai·lia111ent its nmmal role in considering Treaty 
settlement legislation is that it would unde1mine the negotiation process undertaken 
by the Crown and claimants. The agreements will be the culmination of many years 
oflengthy and elaborate negotiations. There is obviously a concern that it not be 
derailed at the last stage by the House making amendments that ai·e unacceptable to 
the paities to the settlement. This problem does not face most legislation, which is 
based on government policy, rather than binding agreements reached between the 
Government and another group. 
The issue has exercised Parliament in recent years. When the gai Tahu settlement 
was before the House, in 1998 then Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi 
Negotiations, Sir Douglas Graham argued that the only decision before Parliament is 
whether to support the legislation put forward by the Government: 
15 
The Crown and Ngai Tahu negotiated for 6 l / 2 years, made compromises on each side, 
and reached an agreement. That agreement requires, in part, legislation to perfect it. That 
legislation is tendered by the Govenm1ent to the House for its consideration. It is not for 
the select committee, nor for the House, to try to renegotiate the deal. It is for the House 
to decide whether it supports the legislation.34 
The role of the select committee was to info1m the House. Unlike other bills, it was 
not to recommend amendments: 
People came to the select committee, as was their right, to comment on the Bill. It is 
unfortmrnte that some of them misunderstood the power of the select committee to deal 
with a Bill of this kind, reflecting as it did the settlement that was made. lt is for this 
Parliament to scrutinise legislation. It is for the select committee to listen to submissions 
and to report to this House the concerns that were expressed, so that members, when they 
take part in the votes during the latter stages of the Bill, will be better infonned. That is 
entirely appropriate. But it is not appropriate in my view that they should try to 
renegotiate the settlement and see it unravel before their eyes afler 7 years of work and 
130 years ofwaiting.35 
The House was ce1tainly not of one mind on the issue. Hon Jim Sutton criticised 
Graham for excluding Parliament from the process.
36 He described the select 
committee process on the bill as a "sham": 
We felt that the people who had been invited to make submissions and hundreds did-
made them in good faith, in the belief that the committee would hear them and, if their 
case was good, recommend changes. 
As a model for the future it would be a disaster. lt tramples on the rights of minority 
groups. The process has been characterised by bullying, bluster, and double-dealing 
behind closed doors .. 
37 
During the debate on re-refening the Ngati Turangitukua Claims Settlement Bill to 
the Maori Affairs Committee, the same issue arose. Tukoroirangi Morgan argued that 
there should be no select committee consideration of settlement legislation: 
34 Rt Hon. Doug Graham (6 August 1998) 570 NZPD 11156 
35 Rt Hon. Doug Graham (26 August 1998) 57 l NZPD 11667. 
36 Hon Jim Sutton (26 August 1998) 571 ZPD 11671 11672. 
37 Hon Jim Sutton (26 August 1998) 571 NZPD 11671 11672. 
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My view is that settlements should come straight to this House. Who arc we as 
politicians to undemline what the people and the Crown have decided and agreed upon? 
Who are we to say to the people and subtribes-hey, we in this J louse are not agreeing; 
we will not agree to what you people have come up with? So what 1 am saying is that 
sending matters like these before a Maori Affairs Committee. or any select committee. is 
a waste of time-a real waste of time.I ft isfar better.for it to be sent directly to the "den 
of lions"for us to sit here to debate the issues and make condemnations and 
accusations. 38 
Donna Awatere Huata saw this argument as an usurpation of the authmity of 
Parliament: 
... the deed of settlement is there and we can take it or leave it. The committee can only 
listen to what people have to say and they can clarify this or that, but at U1e end of the 
day we have a settlement that is set in concrete. ln the view of U1e ACT party this is 
quite clearly wrong. There is no higher auU1ority Urnn Parliament. The select committee 
is an integral part of that authority. To usurp the role of the select committee by not 
allowing i~ to make adjustments as it sees fit is a breach ofilic auU1ority of Parliament. 
To allow that authority to be given over to a bureaucracy, to U1c Office of Treaty 
Settlements, and to a single Minister is clearly wrong. 39 
Despite the debate, the nairnw view on the role of Parliament espoused by Rt Hon Sir 
Douglas Graham has prevailed. As noted earlier his approach was recently adopted 
by the current Government in the instruction to the Maori Affairs Committee on the 
Tutae-Ka-Wetoweto Forest Bill. 
B Advantages of parliamentary scrutiuy 
Certainly Parliament should not be put in a position where its scrutiny could 
unde1mine settlements. It does not follow from this that Parliament should not have 
substantive role to play in the Treaty settlement process. What is needed is a 
constructive role for Parliament in the process. The need to reconsider the cmTent 
38 Tukoroirangi Morgan (5 October 1999) 580 NZPD 19580. The italicised text is translated from 
Maori. 
39 (7 September 1999) 580 NZPD 19376 
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procedures was acknowledged by then Leader of the Opposition, Helen Clark, dming 
the Ngai Tahu debate: 
We can, of course, debate wheti1er this is U1e way in which Treaty settlements should be 
handled in the future. I do appreciate U1c frustration of members ofU1c committee and of 
those who made submissions who wanted to sec changc~
0 
The cmTent procedures followed by the House represent a compromise between the 
desire of the legislature to rigorously scrutinise legislation and the concern not to 
undermine settlements. The result is a process in which scrutiny is weak. Ensu1ing 
effective legislative scrutiny is not merely a theoretical argument about establishing 
constitutionally approp1iate parliamentary processes . Certainly the idea that the 
government of the day can introduce paiticular bills with a presumption that they will 
not be subjected to substantive amendment sits uncomf01tably within our conception 
of the separation of powers between the legislature and the executive. However, 
effective scrutiny is beneficial in itself, not just to ensure some abstract goal of 
'constitutional pmity.' 
Effective parliamentary scrutiny, which would best come in the f01m of select 
committee examination, offers a number of benefits . These include providing an 
independent forum for the voicing of g1ievances, allowing an oppo1tunity to rectify 
any significant problems with the proposed settlement and ensuring the executive 
government's conduct of the negotiation process is subject to critical examination. 
CmTently the opp01tunities for those who disagree with a settlement to place their 
grievances on record before the settlement becomes afait acompli are limited. While 
the executive government, through the Office of Treaty Settlements or Te Puni 
Kokiri , may consult with interested parties, this is not the same as being able to 
highlight concerns in front of a legislative committee charged with scrutinising the 
process. The incentives of the government agencies are also quite different to those 
of a committee of members representing a range of political paities. 
40 Rt Hon Helen Clark (26 August 1998) 571 NZPD 11669. 
Parliamentaiy scrutiny is, by its nature political. It is not impaitial or expe1t scrntiny. 
However, this offers political balance to the interests represented by the executive 
government. Decisions of the political executive (Cabinet) cannot be seen to be 
apolitical. If decisions ai·e devolved to the apolitical , unelected, bureaucracy then 
they require scrntiny from the elected representatives. 
With most settlements there will be disputes within the claimant community . Often 
these will centre on mandate issues . There will often be complaints from groups who 
feel that their concerns have been overlooked. Jt is impo1tant that these paities have 
the oppmtunity to make their concerns known before any settlement is finalised. 
Often settlements will impact on the interests of organised, non-Maori , interest 
groups . It is appropriate for such groups to have access to a forum where they can 
make substantive comment, outside the negotiating process . Doug Graham noted that 
a complication he encountered in balancing the views of Maori and other interests on 
the (executive government) consultation process . He argued that: 
Maori believed that Treaty matters were solely the province of Maori and the Queen· s 
representatives. The public at large, and certainly not [sic] lobby groups such as 
environmentalists, had no part to play and were not entitled even to be consulted.
4 1 
The role of Parliament is not to provide a forum for third parties, Maori or non-Maori , 
to be involved in the negotiation process . However, it can provide a forum outside 
the negotiation process. One which does not have the power to change the settlement, 
but may be able to recommend changes for the paities to the negotiation, the Crown 
a11d the claimant negotiators to consider. 
Parliament, through its committees, is unlikely to challenge the fundamental basis for 
a settlement. However, occasionally scrutiny may reveal the need for substantive 
change. Cunently if this occurs during select committee consideration of 
implementing legislation, it is outside the scope of the committee's consideration to 
recommend changes . If the concerns ai·e substantial enough they could put a majmity 
of Parliament in the position of feeling compelled to reject the settlement. If 
parliamentai·y scrutiny could take place before a settlement was finalised, the 
opportunity would remain for the paities to consider any concerns of this nature that 
41 Graham, Doug, 1997, Trick or Treaty? P 49 
anse. If the settlement between the Crown and the Rakiura Maori Land Trust had 
been scrutinised by the Maori Affairs Committee before the introduction of the Tutae-
Ka-Wetoweto Forest Bill, the committee may have recommended that the 
Government reconsider defining tangata whenua status and custommy 1ights in the 
legislation . The negotiations that had to take place after the select committee stage 
could have taken place before the legislation was drafted. This may even have 
assisted in expediting the progress of the legislation through the House. 
The opp01tunity to comment afforded by a process of parliamentary scrutiny will not 
be on the same level as negotiations . The agreement reached between the Crown and 
claimant negotiators will be the basis of the implementing legislation . Any 
parliamentm·y scrutiny that occurs outside the nmmal legislative process may allow a 
parliamentary committee to recommend to the Government that it attempt to negotiate 
an amendment. However, the Government and the claimant negotiators may well 
reject the suggestion. 
Cunently when a substantive challenge to the settlement is made du1ing the select 
committee consideration of the implementation legislation, as the committee cannot, 
as it does with other legislation, recommend substantive amendments , the risk mises 
that Parliament may feel unable to approve the legislation. However, if the issue had 
arisen at a pre-legislative stage and a recommendation to change the settlement was 
made, and the Government responded, with reasons , rejecting the recommendation it 
would be clem· that the issue had been duly considered. While Pm·liament's role in 
conside1ing the implementation legislation would still be constrained, this role would 
sit more easily with pmliamentarians given the p1ior parliamentm·y scrutiny. 
Speaking during the debate on the consideration of report of Maori Affairs Committee 
on the Ngati Turangitukua Claims Settlement Bill, Rana Waitai expounded the need 
for select committee scrntiny of the actions of the Office of Treaty Settlements: 
In a very real sense the Office of Treaty Settlements is fulfilling a similar function in this 
century to that oflhe Maori Land Court in U1e past. The function of that court was to 
facilitate U1e orderly and lawful alienation oftangata whenua from the land. The Office 
of Treaty Settlements is percei ved increasingly as being a gatekeeper that perpetuates 
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alienation of tangata whenua from its resources. It is U1en Ulat t11e treaty partner must be 
able to look to a body to afford some redress, or, at the very least, some balance to ilie 
overwhelming power oft11e Crown. They have only one body to look to, and t11at is 
Parliament through its assigned subsidiary, the select committee, which in this case is t11e 
Maori Affairs Committee.42 
It is not necessary to apportion any malevolence to the Office of Treaty Settlements to 
accept the necessity of scrutiny of its legislative proposals. The Office of Treaty 
Settlements unde1iakes arduous negotiations on behalf of the Crown . There is little to 
suggest that it prioritises the progression of individual settlements ahead of questions 
of the appropriateness of the settlement offered or the overall settlement process . To 
do so would disadvantage the Office in other negotiations. However, the role of the 
Office of Treaty Settlements is to finalise settlements and the role of the legislature to 
scrutinise legislative proposals. One does not have to believe that the Minist1y of 
Economic Development is working against the interests of economic development to 
believe that the legislative proposals of that minist1y require careful scrutiny. The 
same applies to settlements reached by the Office of Treaty Settlements. This kind of 
scrntiny is also valuable in that, when a government depmtment knows that its 
decisions will be questioned in a public forum, this affects depaitmental behaviour. 
C Potential for change 
Despite perceptions to the contrary, Parliament's processes have shown themselves to 
be quite adaptable. Today's Estimates process is seldom thought of as a legislative 
process . Parliament's own Standing Orders distinguish between "Legislative 
Procedures" in chapter five and "Financial Procedures" (which include the Estimates 
process) in chapter six. Yet underpinning the whole elaborate Estimates process is the 
annual appropriation bill which receives a first reading, is refeITed to a select 
committee, is debated in committee of the whole, receives a third reading and is 
assented to by the Crown. More recently Parliament has adopted special processes to 
facilitate scrutiny of international treaties . As has been previously alluded to, there 
ai·e some strong conceptual pai·allels between the processes concerning international 
treaties and Treaty settlements . Given these parallels , the new international treaty 
-i 2 (5 October 1999) 580 NZPD 19574 - 19575. 
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processes provide a useful sta:iting point in a search for a constructive parliamentary 
role in the Treaty settlement process. 
V HAVING ONE'S CAKE AND EATING IT TOO: THE INTERNATIONAL 
TREATY PROCESS 
In the Westminster tradition the making of international treaties is an executive rather 
than a legislative act. The power to create obligations at the international level with 
another state is pait of the Royal Prerogative - the residue of the legal powers of the 
Crown that Pai·liament has not legislated away. 43 In the United Kingdom, the 
Government is expected to table the text of any proposed settlement in Pmliament 21 
days before it is ratified. However, the government can modify the process .
44 This 
contrasts mai·kedly with the situation in the United States of Ame1ica, where the 
President requires the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate before making a 
treaty .45 However, unlike the United States where treaties become prut of domestic 
law on ratification, in the Westminster tradition they need to be implemented by 
legislation. Fulfilling this requirement has been Parliament's role in the treaty 
process. Where the treaty does not require implementing legislation, Parliament had 
no scrutiny. 
In 1996 the Clerk of the New Zealand House of Representatives made a substantial 
submission to the Standing Orders committee, arguing strongly for pre-ratification 
pa:i·liamentai·y scrutiny of proposed treaties . This submission drew heavily on the 
developments in Australia, where due, at least in pa:it, to the constitutional effect of 
entering into an international treaty in that system
46 there had been moves towards 
greater parliamentaI"y' scrutiny of treaties. In the next parliament the Foreign Affairs , 
Defence and Trade committee inquired into Parliament 's role in the treaty process .
47 
43 Dave McGee "Treaties and the House of Representatives Di scuss ion paper prepared by the Clerk of 
the House of Representatives for the Standing Orders Committee for its review of the operation of the 
Standing Orders" ( 1996) 1-2. 
44 Harry Evans (ed) Odgers ' Australian Senate Practice (9 ed Canberra 1999) 450. 
45 Evans, above, 450. 
46 See for example Commonwealth vs Tasmania ( 1983) 158 CLR l (HCA) 
47 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Tracie Committee Report 0 11 the inquiry into Parliament 's Role in the 
international Treaty Process (1997) 
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The committee recommended a similar process to that proposed by the Clerk of the 
House. Based on the committee's recommendation Parliament staited scrntinising 
treaties on a t1ial basis in May 1998. The process was incorporated into the Standing 
Orders when they were revised in August 1999. 
Standing Order 384 requires multilateral treaties and major bilateral treaties of 
particular significance to be refened to the Foreign Affairs , Defence and Trade 
committee for scrutiny. The committee either examines the treaty itself or refers it to 
the appropriate subject committee, which then rep01ts to the House on its 
examination. 48 The Standing Orders of the House do not specify a time limit for 
committee consideration of treaties . The process was established on the 
understanding that the Government would allow the House time to consider any 
treaties that are refeITed to it before the Government takes any fmther action to ratify 
them. This understanding is reflected in the Cabinet Office Manual which stipulates 
that the Government will: 
refrain from taking any binding action in relation to a treaty that has been presented to 
the House until U1e relevant committee has reported or 15 sitting days have elapsed from 
the date of presentation, whichever is sooner.
49 
From the report of Parliament's Foreign Affairs , Defence and Trade Committee on its 
examination of the Closer Economic Paitnership Agreement with Singapore it seems 
that the thought of select committee scrutiny of treaties is making the Government 
take its consultation process more seriously than it has previously . 
50 However, there 
ai·e a number problems with the process , the most notable of which is the inadequate 
time committees have to consider the treaties refened to them before the government 
can proceed with ratification. This was highlighted dming the debate over the 
Singapore-New Zealand Closer Economic Paitnership, in which Dr Jane Kelsey 
desc1ibed the select committee process as "pointless" .
5 1 CuITently the Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade select committee is considering a member's bill in the 
48 Standing Order 386 
49 Cabinet Office "Cabinet Office Manual " (Wellington, 2001) para 5.88 
5° Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee Report on U1e International Treaty Examination of 
U1e Closer Economic Partnership Agreem ent wiU1 Singapore (2000) 11 . 
5 1 Jane Kelsey "Preface" in Bill Rosenberg Globalisation by Stealth: The proposed New Zealand-Hong 
Kong Free Trade Agreement and In vestment (ARENA, Christchurch, 2001 ) (emphasis added). 
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name of Green MP Keith Locke that would actually require formal parliamentaiy 
approval of treaties before New Zealand ratifies them. However, despite its 
shmtcomings the international treaty process does allow Parliament to have a role it 
did not previously have in scrutinising treaties . 
VI COULD THIS PROCESS BE ADAPTED FOR DEED OF SETTLEMENT 
LEGISLATION? 
This process could provide a model for parliamentaiy scmtiny of deed of settlement 
legislation . Before the Crown finally signs it, the deed could be referred to the Maori 
Affairs Committee for consideration. This could be done simply by way of a 
government motion, without requi1ing any changes to Standing Orders. By motion, 
the House could refer the draft deed to the committee, requiring it to repmt back to 
the House within a prescribed time frame . 
52 
Once the deed is refe1Ted to the committee, it would n01mally call for public 
submissions and request submissions from interested government departments . While 
the Office of Treaty Settlements would have the primary interest, Te Puni Kokiri 
would also be in a position to b1ief the committee on the proposed settlement, as 
would other affected agencies , such as the Depaitment of Conservation and the 
Ministry of Fisheries .53 Following its consideration the committee would be required 
to repmt its findings to the House. If the committee felt that changes were necessaiy, 
and fmmalised these as recommendations , the Government would be required to 
fmmally respond to the House within 90 days in accordance with Standing Order 248. 
The problem with not f01malising the process in Standing Orders is that the 
Government could, at any time dming the process , take action to finalise the 
settlement. For the process to have any value there should be a requirement for the 
Government to delay taking any fmther action until the committee repo1ts to the 
House. 
52 The examination would be an "other matter referred by the House" under Standing Order 189(2). 
53 Departments other than tJ1e Office of Treaty Settlements wou ld require approval from the Cabinet 
Legislation Committee before making their submissions: Cabinet Office "Cabinet Office Manual" 
(Wellington, 2001) para 5.71. 
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The major drawback with undertaking that kind of pre-legislative scrutiny is the 
additional time it would take. A major weakness in the process for scrutinising 
international treaties is that Parliament has too little time to effectively review the 
proposed treaty . To unde1take a thorough examination, a committee really needs a 
minimum of three months . This allows a month for adve1tising for submissions and 
two months to hear evidence and prepare a rep01t to the House. The amount of time 
added to the settlement process by refening proposed settlements to Parliament 
depends greatly on the stage in the negotiation process that the refe1rnl is made. 
There might be some argument that a 'Heads of Agreement' could be refeITed. This 
would allow the scrutiny to take place while the negotiations continued. However, for 
scrntiny to be effective it would be preferable to have a concrete proposal to consider. 
A constructive pre-legislative scrutiny process may also mean that time is saved in the 
House, though the time saved would be modest. As noted earlier, while, with the 
exception of the Ngai Tahu Bill, we have not seen major problems in finding 
legislative time to progress settlement bills , this is likely to become more of a problem 
in the future. The final legislation would still need to be considered by a select 
committee. It is essential that the legislation be evaluated to ensure its provisions give 
proper effect to the negotiated settlement and that there are no e1rnrs of fact or law. 
This was highlighted during the Maori Affairs Committee' s consideration of the 
Tutae-Ka-Wetoweto Forest Bill . A submission from the former Chairperson of the 
Rakiura Maori Land Trust revealed that there was a typographical error in the 
desc1iption of the land covered by the bill. 
54 While it is easy to assume that such an 
eITor would be discovered at some stage, opening legislation up to public submissions 
greatly increases the chances that errors will be detected. 
With public submissions comes the risk that the same issues considered during the 
pre-legislative scrutiny will arise again . lt is hard to see how this can be avoided. lt is 
imp01iant to test the proposed legislative implementation of the settlement. However, 
it could be expected that, in p1ioritising its limited time and resources , a select 
committee when conside1ing the final bill would be unlikely to spend much time on 
re-litigating issues it has already rehearsed during pre-legislative scrutiny. 
54 Tutae-Ka-Wetoweto Forest Bill , no 68-2 (Commentary by the Maori Affairs Conm1ittee) 6. 
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The purposes of pre-legislative and legislative scrutiny are quite different. In the 
latter case, Parliament is acting in its formal law-making capacity . Jn the fo1mer, it is 
infmming itself and having any input that is appropriate into the content of the 
settlement. Prior to the finalis ation of the settlement, the recommendations of 
Parliament may make a difference. In neither case though (as in the international 
treaty case), is it "approving" settlements . That is up to the government, and 
Parliament by its actions is not legislating settlements into domestic law or making 
them part of the law except to the extent that the legislation actually incorporates 
them. It is appropriate that settlements (like international treaties) remain the Crown's 
(government's) responsibility, and that there is no misunderstanding that Parliament, 
in either its pre-legislative or legislative scrutiny roles , is usurping that responsibility 
or giving settlements direct legal effect. 
VII CONCLUSION 
The cuJTent processes for parliamentary scrutiny of Treaty settlement legislation need 
to be reconsidered. What is needed are processes to ensure that proposed settlements 
are subjected to some 1igorous scrutiny, beyond what Cabinet considers to be in its 
interests, and that those disaffected with a settlement have a formal , independent 
fmum in which to give voice to their concerns . 
The cmTent processes for scrutinising international treaties provides a model for a 
constructive parliamentary role. As they stand presently, they are inadequate to the 
task they are designed for. However, with the modifications discussed above, the 
process would be promising. It would allow select committees; primarily the Maori 
Affairs Committee, to examine proposed settlements before they are ratified. The 
Government and the claimants could address any major concerns noted by the 
committee piior to the final sign-off on the deed. 
The processes would also recognise that the interests of the Crown in the settlement 
process are larger than the interests of Cabinet. When negotiations reach Deed of 
Settlement stage, Cabinet approves them on behalf of the Crown. The claimant 
negotiators are required to go back to those that they represent to achieve ratification 
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of the agreement. The refmms proposed can be seen as a fmm of Crown ratification -
with the body that purports to represent all of New Zealand, Maori and non-Maori 
playing a central role. Having gone through this process, Parliament is likely to be 
much less reluctant to expedite the passage of the implementing legislation. 
The Treaty settlement process is of fundamental impmtance to the health of the New 
Zealand polity. It is a highly political process. Any proposed settlement will draw 
criticism from those who feel they have missed out or that their concerns have been 
overlooked. Others will feel the settlement is too mean. Yet others will attack it for 
being too generous. There are also those who doubt the need for, or even the validity 
of, Treaty settlements. The process cannot be divorced from its politics . 
This paper has focussed on the parliamentary stage of the settlement process. This 
stage has its flaws. The proposed refo1ms would improve the situation - but as with 
any refmms, they will not perfect it Given the impmtance of the settlement process it 
is worth taking steps to ensure we have processes best adapted towards ensuring that 
genuinely lasting settlements can be achieved. 
• Marcus Ganley is tl1e Clerk of the Maori Affairs select conunittee. He also assisted the Justice and 
Electoral Committee for its examination of the 2001/02 Estimates for Vote Treaty Negotiations. The 
views reflected in this paper are his own and should not be attributed to either select committee or the 
Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives. 
27 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY 
LAW LIBRARY OF 
A Fine According to Library WELLINGTON 
Regulations is charged on 
Overdue Books. LIBRARY 
~' 1,r f i11111 r11111rr1~ r 1~111~11 ~111111111111111[111111 ~1i~ij~ 
3 7212 00618837 7 
e 
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
Gl97 
2001 

